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CHANGING CASTE RELATIONS AND EMERGING CONTESTATIONS IN PUNJAB 
PARAMJIT S. JUDGE 
 
When scholars and political leaders characterised Indian society as unity in diversity, there were 
simultaneous efforts in imagining India as a civilisational unity also. The consequences of this 
‘imagination’ are before us in the form of the emergence of religious nationalism that ultimately 
culminated into the partition of the country. Why have I started my discussion with the issue of 
religious nationalism and partition? The reason is simple. Once we assume that a society like 
India could be characterised in terms of one caste hierarchical system, we are essentially 
constructing the discourse of dominant Hindu civilisational unity. Unlike class and gender 
hierarchies which are exist on economic and sexual bases respectively, all castes cannot be 
aggregated and arranged in hierarchy along one axis. Any attempt at doing so would amount to 
the construction of India as essentially the Hindu India. Added to this issue is the second 
dimension of hierarchy, which could be seen by separating Varna from caste. Srinivas (1977) 
points out that Varna is fixed, whereas caste is dynamic. Numerous castes comprise each Varna, 
the exception to which is the Brahmin caste whose caste differences remain within the caste and 
are unknown to others. We hardly know how to distinguish among different castes of Brahmins, 
because there is complete absence of knowledge about various castes among them. On the other 
hand, there is detailed information available about all the scheduled castes and backward classes. 
In other words, knowledge about castes and their place in the stratification system is pre-
determined by the enumerating agency. Interestingly, the enumerating agency is state and 
enumeration began in the nineteenth century under the British rule. Various castes and their 
position in the hierarchy of castes were carefully and diligently worked out by the administrators 
with the help of two sources, namely, the available texts and the upper caste Indian civil 
servants, but might not have been constructed the way Dirks (2001) puts forward in his thesis 
that caste was essentially a construct of the British. Therefore, caste hierarchy has been handed 
over to us as episteme – whose textual and empirical bases are well articulated and argued with 
certain basic agreements among sociologists and social anthropologists. Thus we have two 
systems of hierarchy within the Hindu tradition. The first is Varna hierarchy comprised by four 
Varnas, namely, Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vashiya and Shudra. There have been differences of 
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opinion whether the untouchables are part of Shudra Varna. If we assume that four Varnas are 
inclusive, then we put untouchables in the sub-category of Ati-Shudras. 
 Thinking of and then constructing hierarchy among the castes within each Varna is the 
most complex and complicated process largely due to subjective factors such as each middle and 
lower caste tends to claim its existing caste position as a consequence of certain events in the 
mythical past – something coming close to the notion of sin committed accidentally. As a result, 
each caste claims high status, but rarely the Brahmin’s status, and in the process, tends to create 
an exclusive social space for itself. Since most of the castes claim to be having royal (Rajput) 
origin, the virus of exclusiveness resulting from the construction of difference from others is 
endemic in the collective self-image of every caste. Therefore, it has been left to the experts in 
the field to construct a hierarchy of castes within each Varna with the exception of Brahmin 
Varna. We all know that caste in whatever manner has been defined by social scientists and 
administrators in 19th century essentially involves endogamy and birth based status, hereditary 
occupation, some kind of mutual repulsion/exclusiveness and a very complex set of rules on 
what to eat, where to eat and with whom to eat. Whether we call it graded inequality or 
hierarchical order, all these features have been prevalent among all castes – including those 
which wanted to improve their status. 
 Empirically speaking, caste hierarchy is a local phenomenon embedded in the all-Indian 
pattern of grading of castes. However, we have two kinds of hierarchy among castes if we keep 
its local character in mind. The first is the Varna-based hierarchy according to which each caste 
has to be first graded within the Varna system and then positioned in the hierarchy within each 
Varna. Following Weber it may be stated that such a kind of identification of hierarchy is ideal 
typical or a pure type. The second kind of hierarchy is the way the castes are positioned 
empirically. It is expected that there is a lack of fit between the ideal and actual types of 
hierarchy. It is interesting to note that though Srinivas (1977) argues that Varna is fixed but 
castes are dynamic, yet in order to explicate the actual variations in the caste hierarchy, he (1987) 
offers us the concept of ‘dominant caste’, which  virtually covers all deviations from the Varna  
hierarchy. Dominant caste as a concept is too general to be used to distinguish between caste 
hierarchy and Varna hierarchy. This issue also has its ramifications for non-Hindu communities, 
such as Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, which are large in size and do not have Dharma-karma 
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doctrine to support the caste system. These religious communities also claim to be having social 
equality as a part of their creed. However, Indian state recognises only Sikhism among the above 
mentioned communities as caste-laden religious community. The Constitution of India (Article 
25) recognises Sikhism along with Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism, as the religion in which 
castes exist and provides for reservation for the untouchable castes. Thus, whatever the 
polemical and ideological claims and articulations of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak 
Committee (SGPC), castes among the Sikhs and the untouchable castes classified as the 
scheduled castes are constitutionally recognised.  
 However, the existence of castes among the Sikhs should not be taken as the basis of 
argument that caste hierarchy among the Sikhs is similar to the one found among the Hindus 
where any deviance from the standard grading is considered caused by the existence of the 
dominant caste. My argument is that there is no dominant caste among the Sikhs; rather caste 
hierarchy is a system of domination, or to use Berreman’s expression, “power and privilege”. I 
have argued (Judge 2010) that the major contribution of Sikh movement is that it ruptured  the 
correspondence between the binary opposition of physical and non-physical labour which 
bifurcated the caste hierarchy into “dwijjas’ (twice born) and  shudras including untouchables 
(once born). The Jats emerged as the topmost caste among the Sikhs, whereas it is dominant 
caste in Haryana. It should also be noted that the Jats, who have been essentially peasant 
proprietors, live in villages. Their presence in cities implicates occupational changes among 
them. The major point, I wish to raise is that occupational changes in rural India could be taken 
as the basic indicator of change in the caste hierarchy. As such occupational change is 
amorphous, because the issue is whether occupational change leads to the decline in the 
dependence of the people on agriculture. At the same time, it is important to see which particular 
caste is experiencing decline in the dependence on agriculture. In the case of landowning caste, it 
may be an indicator of pauperisation or horizontal shift in economic status. On the other hand, 
declining dependence of working class castes implies freedom from the dependence on 
landowning castes. Interestingly, overall decline in the dependence of working population on 
agriculture implies the major shift in the economy of the state. 
 Whereas occupational changes are experienced at individual level and seen in 
aggregation, the change in caste status has a corporate/community character. To think of a 
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complete change in the hierarchical structure of rural society due to occupational change is not 
logical conclusion. However, it may be argued that as a result of occupational changes there is 
not only an ideal typical end to class-caste correspondence, but also to the structure of economic 
dependence of the working class-cum-lower castes on the landowning castes. Once the umbilical 
chord of economic dependence is broken off, the social space becomes relatively autonomous 
from its economic base. It should be reminded that the capitalist development in agriculture may 
not necessarily bring uniform transformation in the economic conditions of the lower castes. 
Generally, classes begin to form within castes. The manifestation of such a situation gets 
expressed through political behaviour of various castes. Here emerges a paradox of functionality 
of hierarchy. The politics of caste revolves around a community in which the vertical 
heterogeneity is replaced by horizontal solidarity. The liberal democratic framework of Indian 
Constitution though provides for special treatment to certain social groups, but primarily focuses 
on the individual in terms of rights and duties. Caste politics in the liberal democratic framework 
is a negation of the individual-civic oriented Constitution. However, it should be reminded that 
the same Constitution identifies certain groups who require special attention. Such a situation 
creates functionality of collective identity in the political and public spheres. Interestingly, liberal 
framework recognises the individual liberty within the legal framework. In other words, an 
individual is at liberty to pursue his goals so long as he/she does not violate the law.  
The paradox involved engages two discourses and the two cannot pass each other by. For 
example, the exclusion of dalits is not only confined to public and political spheres, but also 
prevails in the way an individual sets his/her priorities and goals in his/her private sphere. 
Occupational change brings in individualisation of castes, but, at the same time, the private 
sphere of individuals does not radically alter as a result. Whereas the declining dependence of the 
lower castes on landowners may manifest through political assertion for power and identity, but 
such situations do not and cannot force the individuals to end exclusiveness. It may reflect on 
how an individual invites people on occasions of marriage and other ceremonies in the family. 
The state, within liberal framework, can definitely interfere in the conduct of individuals in 
public sphere, but the private sphere remains untouched. An interesting example may help us to 
understand the complexity involved in the situation. The use of the caste names of certain ex-
untouchable castes in public has been regarded as legal offence. However, the number of songs 
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in which sons of Chamars have been glorified is large and these are written and sung by 
Chamars.   
It is therefore important that in the study of change in caste hierarchy in rural India, we 
must take cognisance of the following issues for the development of an adequate conceptual 
framework and methodological approach: 
1. What is the criterion on which caste hierarchy in India could be constructed? I argue that 
caste hierarchy is essentially based on the opposition between physical and non-physical 
labour on which the binary opposition of impure and pure are constructed. The cognitive 
mapping of the notion of hierarchy tends to suggest the metaphor of ladder in which each 
caste has a specific position on a vertical continuum. Such an attempt at creating 
hierarchy requires rigorous empirical and statistical exercise – a task almost next to 
impossible. Among various difficulties in such an exercise, one is related to the way 
various castes have constructed their anthropological past on the basis of which they tend 
to claim their position in the caste hierarchy. Deliége (1999) has recorded many myths of 
origin of certain untouchable castes, which show that these castes tend to claim higher 
caste status through their mythical past. We, therefore, have dominant method of first 
creating the caste hierarchy by grouping them according to their Varna status and then 
may try to examine degrees of differentiation within each Varna.  
2. Occupational change could be regarded as the starting point of alteration in the caste 
hierarchy. In certain respects, it amounts to essentialism, for modernisation of Indian 
tradition brought tremendous changes in occupational structure by way of emergence of 
various occupations. With the technological changes, certain occupations radically 
transformed due to which these were adopted by other castes. It is interesting to note that 
many low caste occupations underwent visible and radical status change after the 
introduction of technology. Bal (1995) has shown that after the introduction of 
technology, smithy – a caste occupation of the artisan caste of Lohars - was adopted by 
upper caste entrepreneurs. Occupational change has three dimensions. First, there is 
separation between caste and occupation in such a manner that members of one caste may 
be performing various occupations. Secondly, identified as low status occupations 
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technological change may transform them to capital intensive thus ending low caste 
stigma with them. And thirdly, both the situations may coexist with different statuses. 
3. Economic change is linked with economic independence, but it has multiple trajectories. 
The important issue is whether occupational change has led to improvement in economic 
conditions or it is horizontal movement from one occupation to another of similar status. 
Diversification of occupations brings about economic heterogeneity and, in certain cases, 
emergence of classes within caste. It implicates the issue of degree of traditional 
economic dependence on the landowning castes. It is, therefore important to examine the 
degree of decline in the dependence of various lower castes on the landowning castes in 
the village. 
4. As a corollary to the above, the likelihood of political assertion of lower castes after the 
decline in their dependence on landowning castes increases. Political assertion subsumes 
the fulfilment of two important conditions by the lower castes. These are: presence of one 
lower caste in substantial size and secondly, a minimum degree of organisation of that 
caste. Generally, the better off among the lower castes tend to initiate the process of 
political assertion.  
5. Contemporary India fulfils conditions, largely due to the development of means of 
communication and transport, for a larger level of political assertion among the lower 
castes. To what extent, the local assertion takes the form of or gets affiliated with the 
state or national level political expression of dissent and assertion is an important issue 
for examination. 
 
In the light of the above arguments of methodological concerns, the issue of caste hierarchy in 
Punjab, with special reference to the scheduled castes, has been taken up for discussion. The 
discussion has been divided into five parts. The first part takes cognisance of the caste structure 
of Punjab, whereas the second deals with the social anthropology of Jat Sikhs of Punjab the 
reasons for which are twofold. First, the Jat Sikhs constitute the two-third of the Sikh population 
and secondly, most of them live in villages because they are class of peasant proprietors 
implying that any reference to change in caste hierarchy entails the examination of the 
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relationship between Jat Sikhs and other castes. The third part takes stock of the changes that 
have taken place in the caste hierarchy it is largely be based on my already published work. The 
fourth part outlines certain political consequences of changes in caste, whereas the final part 
concludes the discussion. 
 
I. Caste Hierarchy in Punjab 
 
In certain respects, Punjab is no different form rest of India having, at the same time, certain 
distinctive features from other regions. It is strongly embedded in caste system, but a majority of 
its population is not Hindu, but follows egalitarian ideology of Sikhism. Since Sikh community 
is comprised by “castes’, the influence of Hindu social organisation is empirically evident. A 
small population of Christians in the state is treated as coterminous with “Churha”, the 
scavenging caste. The still small presence of Buddhists assumes the existence of Ambedkarites 
who followed him till end. There are two kinds of Muslims in Punjab. First, there are Muslims 
who are living in Malerkotla and there is a widespread impression that most of them are Kamboh 
by caste. Secondly, spread all over Punjab are few families of Mirasis living in certain villages. 
Mirasis are Dums by caste.  
 Punjab, despite its small size, is still full of diversity in terms of caste, region and culture. 
Let us focus on region to explain certain axes of diversity in Punjabi social life. There are three 
broad regions of Punjab, namely, Doaba, Majha and Malwa. These regions are different form 
each other in terms of caste and religion. Doaba is predominantly the Hindu belt of Punjab. 
Though Jats are the major caste group, but like other regions, they are not all Sikhs. Most of the 
dalits except Bazigars and Julahas are Hindu. The expression Hindu may be highly contentious 
in light of the fact that the Ad-dharmis claim to be having their religion as Ad-dharm. Virtually 
all the Bhangis are Balmikis. On the other hand, the percentage of Chamars is very low in the 
Majha region and Balmikis are living in urban areas, but in rural areas Mazabis are the most 
numerous. However, among the landowners, the Jat Sikhs are the most preponderant. Malwa is 
the biggest region in size and population and thus its sub-regions resemble Doaba and Majha. 
The common denominator continues to be the prevalence of Jat Sikhs. Mazabis, Balmikis and 
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Chamars predominate in different sub-regions of Malwa. It should also be noted that there are 
other caste groups which belong to the class of landowners. In Doaba region, Thakur, Saini, 
Lobana, Ahluwalia and Mahaton are landowners. In Majha, Kamboh, Saini and Rajput are the 
main landowning castes after Jat Sikhs. In Malwa, Kamboh, Rajput and Saini are landowners. So 
far as the middle artisan castes are concerned, their distribution is uniform in the sense that 
almost every village has a few families of different artisan castes. I found that in village Basarke 
Bhaini in Amritsar district, there was a substantial population of Kumhars. There are such 
villages where a single middle caste is numerical preponderant, but it is rare in Punjab. In the 
Doaba region a majority of OBCs are Hindus except for Ramgharias and Chhimbas. In other 
regions of Punjab, most of the OBCs have adopted Sikhism. The other caste group which is not 
numerous, but could be found in most of the villages is that of Khatri/Arora/ Baniya, the business 
castes.  Baniyas dominate in the Malwa villages, whereas Khatris and Aroras are more numerous 
in the Majha, Doaba regions and certain parts of Malwa. Most of the Baniyas are Hindus, 
whereas Khatri/Aroara are both Hindus and Sikhs with the strong tradition of interfaith marriage 
within caste without any hurdle. In villages, many Khatri/Aroras are landowners. We are now 
left with Brahmin caste in villages. Long time back Parkash Tandon (1963) wrote a comment on 
Brahmins of Punjab as marginal to the Punjabi society.  It particularly holds true for the rural 
Brahmins even now. 
 We have not yet got the latest information regarding the population of the scheduled 
castes in Punjab, they constitute 29.8 per cent of the total population of Punjab according to the 
2001 census. There are 39 scheduled castes of which Rai Sikh/Mahatam and Mochi castes have 
been recently added. Most prominent scheduled castes in Punjab are two, namely, Chamar and 
Churha/Bhangi castes. What is called dalit politics of Punjab revolved around these two major 
players. We do not have percentage information about the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) 
though there are 69 castes among them. There are three major OBC castes in Punjab. They are 
Kambohs, Ramgarhias and Lobanas. All these three castes are well off in general. The 
Ramgarhias – carpenter caste – do not enjoy good living conditions in villages in comparison to 
their counterparts in cities. Both Kambohs and Lobanas are middle level peasants and are known 
as vegetable growers. Before partition of Punjab, Arains were also vegetable growers. Other 
OBCs are not living in exclusive localities in villages, because their number is low in every 
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village. Suniaras have become urbanised though some of them live in villages and are 
shopkeepers. 
 Among the upper caste landowning farming castes in villages Jats are the most numerous 
followed by Rajputs, Sainis and Mahtons. The spread of other castes such as Brahmins, Khatris, 
Aroras and Baniyas follows the pattern similar to the artisan OBCs. All of them are shopkeepers 
though in some villages they are also landowners. Brahmins own and cultivate land in some 
villages in Punjab, but such villages are countable on fingers. Sharma (2008) conducted a study 
on Brahmins in village Roopwali Brahminan Di in Amritsar district and found that all the 
Brahmin respondents were landowners and involved in farming. Villages Raurhian and Marhuli 
Brahmina in Hoshiarpur district have landowning Brahmins.    
 Is it possible to construct caste hierarchy in rural Punjab? Sharma (ibid.), in her study of 
Brahmins, found that though most of the respondents perceived Brahmins to be the highest caste, 
but they maintained that they did not have requisite respect in the society. Therefore, if we accept 
the ideal typical construction of caste hierarchy, then we shall have to follow the Varna scheme 
and the concept of dominant caste. Since these two concepts as developed by Srinivas mutually 
reinforce each others existence, I have rejected these two for the analysis. Moreover, Punjab is a 
Sikh majority state and in rural Punjab with few exceptions, the Sikhs are numerically 
overwhelming in number (about three fifth of the total population of the state according to 2001 
census). Among the rural Sikhs, the peasant castes, namely Jats, Sainis, Mahtons, Kambohs and 
Lobanas, who own and operate land, dominate the social and cultural lives of villages. Among 
these castes Jat Sikhs are the most numerous and within the Sikh community constitute almost 
two-third of the total population. Therefore, Jats Sikhs are not simply the dominant caste, but 
also the upper caste in rural Punjab. Therefore we create a hierarchy of four groups of castes 
based on landownership, numerical size at the local level and the political visibility at the local 
as well as state levels, which could be stated as following: 
1. At the top are the peasant castes which could be graded in vertical hierarchy. We thus 
have Jats, Rajputs, Sainis, Mahtons, Lobana and Kamboh having the high status in their 
respective order. It has been already informed that Kambohs and Lobanas are classified 
as OBCs.  
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2. Following the above are Brahmins, Khatri, Arora, Baniya, Ahluwalia and Ramgarhia 
castes. Ahluwalias formerly known by the name of Kalal are a caste of liquor distillers. 
At present they are upper caste without any traditional stigma. Ramgarhias were upper 
caste till the end of 20th century, but a section among them strived for OBC status purely 
for the purpose of benefits from the reservation policy for the OBCs. What facilitated 
their relegation to the OBC status was the occupational diversity among the Ramgarhias. 
Unlike other states where these artisan occupations, namely, carpenter, smith and mason 
are performed by different castes, in Punjab all the three activities are carried out be one 
caste. Generally called as Tarkhans, the Ramgarhias converted to Sikhism as a result of 
which they experienced tremendous corporate mobility. 
3. The next set in the hierarchy is comprised by service/artisan castes of various names 
prominent among them are Suniars, Lohars, Chhimbas, Jheers, Kumhars, etc. Most of 
these castes are not involved in their traditional occupations, but in villages their 
traditional, in limited degree, calling is still going on.  
4. All untouchable castes like Meghs, Chamars, Sansis, Bazigars, Mazabi/Balmiki, etc. 
 
What kind of internal caste hierarchy could be constructed is a matter of perspective, but the 
post-colonial Punjab, particularly the one whose boundaries were finalised in 1966, has been 
characterised by the above mentioned hierarchy. What is notable is that within each set of castes 
vertical hierarchies exist in terms of certain subjective and objective criteria. There are castes 
claiming Rajput status and practicing exclusiveness. There is no such thing as horizontal 
differentiation, for each caste claims certain position within the vertical grading of prestige and 
status. Certain castes which have been put at the second place are predominantly living in urban 
areas and their number is small in villages.  
 
II. Jat Sikhs and the Character of Their Dominance 
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The Jat Sikh of Punjab is without exception proud of its caste to the extent that he distinguishes 
himself fro other Jats (Hindus and belonging to Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan) by 
claiming that he is the ‘Jatt’. The rise of Jat Sikh to the top ladder of social, economic and 
political structure of Punjab society is linked to various subjective and objective conditions and 
dates back to medieval period. Habib (1976) regards the role of Sikhism in raising the social 
status of the Jats as crucial, for there was a lag between their economic mobility and social 
status. The otherwise lower caste Jats within the Hindu caste hierarchy faced the lack of fit 
between their economic and social positions. They worked hard and improved their economic 
conditions. Habib opines that their conversion to Sikhism helped them in raising their social 
status. It seems that Jats, through their hard work, transformed their conditions by becoming 
landowners. Waris Shah, who was a Sayyad, resented the rise of Jats as sirdar/chaudhary – the 
prefixes for the landowner. Waris Shah counts all the qualities of the Jats which situate them at 
the lower stratum of caste hierarchy (Judge 2008). Essentially commenting upon the Muslim 
Jats, Waris Shah points out that their women work in the fields, they have disgraceful manners 
and they offer their daughters to outsiders. He goes to the extent of saying that Jats have no god; 
only devil is their god. At the same time, he is immensely fascinated by their progress and rise. It 
is clear that Habib’s thesis of status dissonance leading to their conversion to Sikhism is one 
sided view of the social mobility of Jats.  
 The division of Jats according to religions did not perpetuate the caste hierarchy which 
had been in existence in the ideal typical form. The comments of Waris Shah make it clear that 
the Muslim Jats successfully raised their status. The partition of India has handicapped our 
understanding of comparative reality of caste divided in three religious communities. Habib’s 
argument is not strongly supported by the historical evidence. The conversion of Jats to Sikhism 
is essentially a 20th century phenomenon as is clear form the Census of 1931 (Khan 1933). In 
1881 the population of Hindu Jats was 1,445, 374 and that of Sikh Jats were 1,122,673. Whereas 
the Sikh Jats in 1931 were 2,133,152, the Hindu Jats were 992,309. It is thus clear that certain 
factors contributed to the conversion of Jats to Sikhism. We may partly attribute the rise of the 
population of the Sikhs in general and Jats in particular in the first three decades of the 20th 
century to the proselytising activities of the Singh Sabha movement. Equally important factor 
was the British policy of army recruitment on the principle of martial race. Fox (1985) has 
lucidly explained how the construction of certain communalities as martial races and their 
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subsequent recruitment to the army by defining the Sikh in a particular manner created the 
defining element of religious identity. It may be commented that in Sikh regiments the keeping 
of “Five Ks” (kes-unshorn hair, kanga – comb, karha – iron bangle, kachha – long breeches and 
kirpan – sword) were strictly enforced during the British rule in the 20th century. Khan (1933) is 
of the view that the conversion to Sikhism from Hinduism was quite easy and makes it an 
explanatory principle. In fact, during the first two decades of 20th century, there were fluctuations 
in the population of Punjab due to epidemics such as plague and influenza, but the number of 
Sikhs continued to grow and interestingly the Jats constituted virtually two-third of the 
population of the Sikhs.  
 The emergence of Jat Sikhs in the post-independence period till today as the political 
force at all levels of political governance is a result of three major historical occurrences, 
namely, partition of Punjab at the time of independence, reorganisation of Punjab into Punjabi 
Suba in 1966 and the green revolution that began in 1967. The partition of Punjab led to the 
emergence of East Punjab without the majority population of Muslims who became the 
inhabitants of West Punjab in Pakistan. The formation of Punjabi Suba in 1966 created the state 
in which the Sikhs were in majority among whom Jat Sikhs were in overwhelming majority. 
Since Jats Sikhs constituted bulk of rural peasantry, the green revolution made them prosperous. 
It may also be mentioned that among the Punjabi diaspora the Jat Sikhs are more than 70 per cent 
of the total.  During the Khalistan movement in Punjab most of the militants belonged to the Jat 
caste (Puri et. al. 1999). Some of these issues will be elaborated in the next part of the paper. The 
post colonial transformation among the Jats was linked with certain important occurrences in the 
colonial period. According to Marenco (1976), the Jat Sikhs experienced corporate mobility, 
whereas most of the other castes did not have such a change. There were cases of individual 
mobility among other Sikh castes in rural areas, but the Jats were the main beneficiaries of 
colonial political economy. The British policy towards Sikhs remained one of appeasement, for 
they had the mammoth task of rehabilitating the Sikh soldiers so as to prevent any future 
revolt/mutiny. Moreover, the British also chose to recruit the members of the same caste of Sikhs 
who abounded in the Khalsa army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his successors. Two measures 
of the British strengthened the power of the Jat Sikh in particular and the peasant proprietors in 
general. One, there was construction of canal networks in the Western Punjab and the 
impoverished peasantry from the eastern parts of Punjab were settled in the command areas of 
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Montgomery, Lyallpur and Sargodha districts. Among these resettled were also included the ex-
soldiers the British army. Two, the enactment of the Land Alienation Act of 1901, did not only 
enable the peasant castes to keep land with them, but also put a virtual end to the path of social 
ability through landownership of the non-peasant castes.  
 In the light of the above discussion, it becomes clear that starting form the late-19th 
century to the post-colonial period up to 1970, policies of the government favoured, reinforced 
and reproduced the dominance of the Jat Sikhs in social, economic, cultural and political life of 
the present Punjab.  In the previous sections two social facts about Punjab have been underlined. 
First, there is no one caste hierarchy cutting across religious lines implying that there are 
multiple caste hierarchies. Second, in the rural Punjab, the Jat Sikhs along with other landowning 
castes occupy top position in the caste hierarchy. Marenco (1976) was the first to identify the 
difference in hierarchies according to religion in Punjab, but she worked out her argument by 
arguing that the colonial intervention led to the emergence of classes which were comprised of 
heterogeneous castes. Marenco (ibid.: 295) comments, “The Sikhs afford an example of the 
perpetuation of a caste system, with a rearrangement of the caste hierarchy”. There are variations 
in the features of caste systems of Hindus and Sikhs. For instance, among the Hindus endogamy 
is the rule, whereas among the Sikh though endogamy is practiced, yet there are instances of 
intercaste marriages. Marenco (ibid.) further makes an interesting point, that is, even though 
caste and occupations are overlapping and some changes are there, but in the case of Sikhs, 
certain occupational changes have corporate character. The most important difference is in terms 
of tremendous decline in the commensal and ritual taboos. 
 What has demarcated the Jat Sikhs from their Hindu counterparts is the total absence of 
caste associations and Khap Panchayats among them. Punjab has caste associations of virtually 
every caste except the Jat Sikhs. Pettigrew (1978) has exhaustively dealt with the prevalence of 
factions among the Jat Sikhs. These factions are vertically linked at two levels. At the first level 
there is a vertical unity at the village level. Different classes of Jats are linked with the big 
landowner of village. There may be low caste members in the factions who are generally 
attached labourers of the landowners. The second level is the link this village level faction has at 
the regional and state levels, virtually connected to the political dynamics of the state. The two 
political parties, as it happened in the case of Kairon-Rarewala rivalry, may interact in terms of 
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the representation of their respective factions. The two political parties, which come to power 
alternatively, have been completely controlled by the Jat Sikhs. Pettigrew oversimplified the Jat 
politics, but the fact remains that the existence of factions within and between political parties is 
an empirical reality.  
 McLeod (1976) has vividly described the overall domination of the Jat Sikhs not only in 
the rural Punjab, but in Punjab as such. The important issue he underlines is that whereas other 
Sikh castes feel compulsions of religious identity to maintain at least unshorn hair failing which 
they lose their Sikh identity, such compulsions do not exist for the Jat Sikh. Even if he trims his 
hair or smokes tobacco, he continues to be a Sikh - the fact emphasises the overall domination of 
the Jat Sikh in Punjab. In fact, certain simple facts which still prevail ipso facto lead to this 
conclusion. First, by assuming that the castewise figures of 1931 census are still applicable, we 
may say that the Jat Sikhs constitute two-third of the Sikh population of Punjab. At present the 
population of Sikhs in Punjab is about sixty per cent, which implies that the population of Jat 
Sikhs in Punjab is almost 40 per cent. There is no other caste which is this numerous. The other 
numerous castes in villages of Punjab are Chamars and Mazabis. Secondly, most of the Punjabi 
popular songs mention Jat in terms of cultural ethos of Punjab. Most of the Punjabi singers 
belong to the Jat caste. The most important issue for politicians, fiction writers and singers is the 
farmer and his problems. The cultural ethos of Punjab have become synonymous with Jat ethos. 
In Punjab villages, the Jat Sikh is economically dominant and till recently all the service castes 
depended on him for their survival. The manifestation of social, cultural and economic 
domination of the Jats Sikhs occurs at all levels of formal political processes of the state.  With 
the exception of the BJP (the BSP is almost extinct) every political party has overwhelming 
presence of the Jat Sikhs. After the formation of Punjabi Suba in 1966 there was only one chief 
minister of Punjab who was not a Jat, namely Giani Zail Singh. At the village level, the sarpanch 
would invariably be from the landowning caste. If the village is covered under 73rd amendment, 
then the Sarpanch would be the candidate of some Jat landowner. Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) 
also controls the SGPC (Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee), which is an elected body 
and by inference the Jat Sikhs control it.  
 It is quite clear from the above description of the empirical facts that the Jat Sikhs 
dominate in the every walk of life of Punjab. Thus anything that happens in Punjab villages has a 
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stamp of Jats on it. All struggles against landowners have been waged against Jats. All conflicts 
between the dalits and the upper caste during Panchayat elections involve Jats as one of the 
parties.  It also implies that any mention of change in the caste hierarchy of rural Punjab will 
have take cognisance of whether the status of Jat Sikh has been affected or challenged. Keeping 
all these issues in mind, it is important to examine changes in the caste hierarchy in Punjab. 
 
III. Making Sense of Changes in Caste Hierarchy 
 
We may now look into the changes that have taken place in the hierarchy. The transformation in 
the rural caste hierarchy could take place as a result of two forces, namely, end of ascendant 
position of agriculture and diversification of occupations due to the development process. 
Without the decline in the dependence of the working population on land, the caste structure 
cannot change in villages. Punjab experienced the reverse process in the sense that it experienced 
high agricultural productivity – a process known as the green revolution. Seen retrospectively, 
the green revolution was the phenomenon of capitalist agriculture. We are all familiar with the 
mode of production debate in Indian agriculture that began in late 1960s and continued till the 
end of 1970s. The strengthening of agriculture in Punjab might not have necessarily reinforced 
the caste hierarchy, but it certainly raised the labour requirements in the initial phase. The 
introduction of multiple cropping and intercropping transformed the feudal mode of production 
into capitalist agriculture. Decline in the sepidari/jajmani system and the introduction of payment 
of wages in cash changed the relationship between the farmer and the labourer. The farmer 
developed market orientation and began to move away from his traditional obligation towards 
artisans and labourers. However, the decade following the onset of green revolution did not only 
benefit the farmer, but also improved conditions of the labourer. 
The 1970s witnessed the unprecedented influx of the migrant labourers from Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar, which helped the farmers to depress wages and dictate terms to the local labourers. 
The local labourers had already begun to move to other occupations. In fact, there was chain 
reaction to the development process in Punjab. The artisan classes, comprised by carpenters, 
masons, tailors, etc. started taking up new occupations. Education and the emerging new skilled 
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occupations provided opportunities to the artisan classes who were largely the middle castes. 
Once these castes began to slowly abandon their skills in favour of others, the void they left 
became opportunity for the lower castes, particularly the Chamars. In other words, education and 
occupation could be taken as two important variables in making conjectures about various 
ruptures in the caste hierarchy. However, there were also other forces influencing positively as 
well as negatively the changes in the caste hierarchy. International migration of Punjabis, 
particularly of the lower castes, has contributed towards the undermining of caste hierarchy in 
rural areas. On the other hand, the Khalistan movement, which employed terrorist means, 
contributed towards the sustenance of the domination of the Jat Sikhs in Punjab. Before we 
elaborate on changes in education and occupation, it is pertinent to comment on emigration and 
terrorism as factors influencing caste hierarchy. 
Emigration is a process of movement of people from the country of origin to the country of 
destination. Most of Punjabi emigrants went to North America and Australia in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. What is notable about this emigration is that there were some lower caste 
migrants among the numerically preponderant Jat Sikhs (Judge and Bal 2009 and Judge 2010). 
After independence the volume of emigration went up and dalits and other lower castes 
constituted a noticeable proportion among the emigrants. Till the end of 1960s emigrations were 
largely confined to the Doaba region of Punjab comprised by Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar and 
Kapurthala districts. The trend changed in 1970s when emigration to Canada started occurring 
from other regions of Punjab too. Migration to the Gulf countries for temporary period but for a 
considerably long time such as seven years began in a big way in 1970s and still continues. 
Among the labour migrants to Gulf countries middle and lower caste men constituted nearly half 
of them though the Jats Sikhs continued to be more numerous. The impact on caste hierarchy in 
Punjab due to migrations has not directly occurred in the sense that egalitarian values could be 
stated as important factors. In fact, the USA, Canada, England, Australia and New Zealand all 
practice birth based inequalities and exclusions based on race and ethnicity. The experience of 
Punjabis with regard to racism and ethnic discrimination in these countries has reinforced their 
perception of the existence of birth-based inequalities. Caste system is quite close to them except 
for the fact that it does not divide population into two broad camps like white and black or white 
and coloured. The impact of emigration could be understood in terms of the effect of foreign 
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money. Money brought prosperity to some dalit families who started constructing big houses, 
buying land and/or establishing businesses.  
Emergence of the Khalistan movement took place in 1980s and it continued till 1995. 
Starting from various trends in the Punjab politics, its culmination into an insurgency was the 
culmination of various factors such as nation-building process in India, centre-state relations, 
national level parties versus regional parties and struggle for domination among parties. Among 
the socio-economic factors: green revolution in a Sikh majority state, sub-division of 
landholdings and the construction of identity discourse among the Sikhs contributed towards the 
emergence of terrorism in Punjab. Terrorism played a significant role in reinforcing caste-class 
inequalities in rural areas. In the light of egalitarian claims of Sikhism, it may be expected that 
the Sikh insurgency might have made an attempt to put an end to caste system. However, social 
dynamics had been quite different in this regard. In a collaborated study in which I participated 
(Puri et. al 1999), the data collected on the social background of the Sikh militants in 28 villages 
of Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts indicated that an overwhelming majority of them is Jat 
Sikhs. Most of them owned land and had been exposed to the landowner-worker relationships. 
They largely operated in the area to which they belonged and were intimately familiar with what 
was going on in their villages. Therefore, we did not witness any opposition to the landowning 
castes in villages by the lower castes. However, in 1980s the phenomenon of DS4 (Dalit Shoshit 
Samaj Sangharsh Samiti) formed by Kanshi Ram before he organised the BSP (Bahujan Samaj 
Party) showed its presence through cycle marches with blue flags. Since cities were less affected 
by terrorism than villages, the village dalit youth also joined the process in cities. However, most 
of the villages remained stifled under the grip of terrorism. It is interesting to note that there is no 
evidence to suggest that the agricultural productivity went down in Punjab during these years. 
Most of the facts tend to suggest that terrorism did not touch upon the social fabric of Punjab so 
far as caste and caste relations were concerned; rather owing to the caste-class background of 
militants, the position of Jats was strengthened.  
Major transformation was taking place in the economic arena in terms of occupational 
changes – a process that had begun earlier, but got crystallised and became visible in 1990s. The 
percentage of agricultural workers declined significantly. From 23.8 per cent in 1991 the 
agricultural workers declined to 16.4 per cent in 2001 in Punjab. Between 1991 and 2001, the 
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percentage of cultivators reduced from 31.4 to 23. It is the ‘Other Worker’ category that saw an 
increase from 43.5 per cent to 57.3 per cent in the state (Judge 2008). It happened as the result of 
the growth of service sector. Globalisation had arrived. The important research query with regard 
to the implication for caste hierarchy is whether the occupational changes led to the decline in 
the dependence of the various lower castes on agriculture or not. In pursuance of the above 
query, Table 1 was worked out on the basis of data collected at different points of time for 
different purposes, but containing the information about occupation of the people. In certain 
respects, the data in each column given in Table 1, contains exclusive information and may not 
be compared with each other due to time and space variations. Still the data are presented in 
percentages in order to have limited comparative understanding. The data have been worked out 
by constructing analytical categories in terms of their relationship with agriculture and village.  
Each category shows the nature and character of the occupation of the respondents in relation to 
the agriculture. There are only two pure types used here, namely cultivation and agricultural 
labour. Rest of the occupations are categorised in terms of whether the work of the respondent is 
dependent on agriculture or it takes him away to the city. Let us now examine the data in the 
Table 1. 
 Table 1: Percentage distribution of persons in terms of their occupation in relation to 



















N4 = 140 
(Amritsar and 
Gurdaspur) 
Cultivation/Farming 2.5 0.62 24.35 0.71 
Agricultural Labour - 28.13 2.63 5.00 




Work in the Village 
17.5 23.88 10.43 26.43 
Non-Agricultural: 
Partly in village, 
Partly Outside 




8.75 19.75 20.62 35.71 
Not Applicable 8.00 9.75 - 7.86 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Note: 1. The Table has been compiled from four different studies conducted by the author at different points of time. 
See Judge (2010) for N1, Judge and Bal (2009) for N2, Judge (2010) for N3, and N4 has been taken from the ongoing 
study on the “Politics of Exclusion among the Sikhs” being conducted by the Paramjit S. Judge and Manjit Kaur. 
2. N1 consists of scheduled caste respondents belonging to Hoshiarpur district, N2 is comprised by respondents 
hailing form Jalandhar and Amritsar districts, N3 covers all households of four villages in Amritsar district, and N4 
consists of respondents from Amritsar and Grudaspur districts. 
 
To start with 1985 data regarding dalits in Hoshiarpur district, the most notable characteristic 
of the dalits was that 61.25 per cent of the respondents were partly dependent on agriculture. All 
of them were agricultural labourers, but at the same time, they used to work as casual workers in 
the village as well as outside the village. They were also involved in the non-agricultural work in 
the village. Most of them had abandoned their traditional occupations. Only 8.75 per cent were 
working outside the village. In a way, the data showed certain trends for the future as the process 
of breaking away from agricultural labour had begun. The process became evident in 2004 when 
the data collected in Amritsar and Jalandhar districts in 2004, about dalits showed clear-cut 
decline in agricultural labour. Non-agricultural work in the village and working out of village 
became more pronounced. In the study of four villages of Amritsar district in 2007, the 
information regarding all the households was collected. Whereas 23.35 per cent of the household 
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were engaged in cultivation, the percentage of agricultural labourers was as low as 2.63 per cent. 
There were 35.50 per cent of the households, who were partly dependent on agriculture. Though 
all of them were not workers, yet there are unambiguous indications. There has been a 
continuous decline of exclusively dependent workers on agriculture. The Mazabis are considered 
the lowest of low among the dalits. They are Sikh Bhangis though they have been prominently 
engaged as attached labourers under the jajmani system in villages. The information about their 
occupation was collected in 2010 from ten villages of Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts, five 
from each district. The data clearly indicate that they are either engaged in non-agricultural work 
in the village or they depend on the work they do outside the village. Inferences that could be 
drawn from the data without applying any statistical technique are as follows. 
1. There is a visible movement of the people away from agriculture as the main source of 
livelihood. Whereas the landowners are still involved in cultivation, the traditional caste 
of agricultural labourers, mainly dalits, have noticeably moved away from agricultural 
labour. 
2. As a matter of common knowledge, the migrant labourers from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh 
have either facilitated the shift towards the non-agricultural occupations among the local 
dalits or filled the void created as a result of the movement of the local labourers to non-
agricultural occupations. Both seem to have worked, though the former could be taken as 
more decisive and pronounced factor in this regard. 
3. The movement away from the agriculture is also accompanied by the movement out of 
the village and, more importantly, to the cities. The workers are not only getting better 
wages in the cities, but are also getting exposed to different social worlds and ideologies. 
4. The economic interdependence between the landowner and the worker including the 
artisan in which the latter had been trapped for centuries has considerably broken down. 
The process may not be complete yet, but the space for dalit assertion has been created.  
We may now move to examine the implications of all these changes for the change in the 
caste hierarchy in rural Punjab. As such, the caste hierarchy does not seem to have disappeared. 
Two factors are reinforcing or sustaining caste hierarchy. First, the government has expanded its 
social interventionist strategy by clearly creating and legitimising caste hierarchy. From the 
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perspective of the Indian state we have threefold division of castes in India, namely, upper 
castes, other backward classes and the scheduled castes. Excepting the upper castes, all other 
castes are eligible for certain benefits/preferential treatment. Therefore, even when we do not 
want to have caste identity, the Indian state has ensured that it does not happen. Second, the caste 
hierarchy as it exists has become highly functional for those castes which seem to have stake in 
the due continuity of the caste hierarchy. 
We may now focus on various forces that have consequences for the caste hierarchy in the 
form of its decline. Two important dimensions of change could be witnessed. First, occupational 
changes have reduced the dependence of lower castes on the agriculture leading to decline in the 
upper dominant landowning castes’ ability to maintain the system of hierarchy in the economic 
sphere. Secondly, the state intervention despite its due recognition to the caste hierarchy has led 
to the decline in the caste based discrimination and atrocities. Based on its libertarian agenda, the 
Indian state has made provisions for equal rights to all the citizens of the country. Thus, there are 
reasonable grounds to argue that caste hierarchy is undergoing change but hierarchical structure 
as a mental construct continues to exist. Normatively, under the forces of change hierarchy 
should pave the way for differentiation without status inequalities. The process has started, but 
has not completely replaced hierarchy. Its most visible manifestations could be empirically 
observed in the political/public sphere, because the state intervention and occupational changes 
have created a public space for contestations. The proceeding discussion is an examination of 
political consequences of these changes in Punjab. 
 
IV. Caste and Politics in Punjab 
 
Punjab is a small state, but it is still regarded as part of the mainstream. Ever since the British 
rule, Punjab has been providing canon fodder to the both the colonial and post-colonial states in 
the form of soldiers. The other contribution of Punjab has been the green revolution and, at one 
point of time, it was regarded as the food bowl of India.  However, in terms of social structure 
and process, it is one of those frontier states which are Hindu minority states. Sikhism is the 
prominent and dominant religion in Punjab.  The Sikh political leadership has consistently 
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maintained ambivalent relationship with Hinduism. Starting from the 19th century to the present, 
the Sikh leaders have constructed a distinct identity of the Sikh, claiming that they are not 
Hindus. At the same time, they sought the Constitutional protection for the lower castes in the 
community similar to those among the Hindus. At the moment, the Akali party and the BJP are 
running the coalition government in Punjab.  
 The Sikh movement has played an important role in shaping the cultural and political 
consciousness of the people in Punjab. Owing to the Sikh ideology and practice of equality of 
worship, the Sikhs opened their religious places for the lower castes, but Sikhism could not 
eradicate caste inequality though towards the end of 19th century the Sikh ideologues began to 
argue that Sikhism did not believe in caste. The formation of Sikh community in Punjab created 
three kinds of caste societies, namely Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, which interpenetrated only with 
regard to the untouchable castes. In the post-independence period, the Hindus and the Sikhs 
remained as the two main communities. Whereas the Hindu upper castes were more or less 
confined to the cities, the Sikhs predominated in the villages. The Jat Sikhs were not only the 
dominant caste, but also constituted the upper caste within the Sikh community. Jat Sikhs 
continue to be the dominant upper caste in Punjab even today. Therefore, the notion of dominant 
caste does not apply in Punjab. Since the Jats are both the upper caste and the dominant caste, the 
opposition to them or contestation against them signifies questioning the caste hierarchy.   
 There is no serious effort on the part of any low caste to improve its status through 
sanskrtisation, though attempts at claiming Rajput status are numerous. Punjab got a different 
model of status mobility – a model which combined landownership with religious conversion. 
The importance of Sikhism lies in providing an avenue for social mobility while at the same time 
remaining in broad Hindu world-view in which beef eating was regarded as sin. All these 
conceptions underwent a radical irrelevance in 1990s when religion remained important, but 
politics of identity began to surface in a big way. The earlier developments had already prepared 
the platform for the identity politics. Let us see how it happened in the case of the dalits in 
Punjab, as the contestation against the landed castes started from them. 
 Shah (2002) has rightly emphasised the importance of numerical strength of a caste as an 
important factor in democratic politics, but it is not necessary that more than one caste would 
join together to make a political front. The Ad-dharma experiment of 1920s has failed in Punjab 
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on this score. Over a period of time, the Ad-dharmi and Chamar have become overlapping 
identities. Shah (ibid.) examines caste politics in terms of the dynamics of caste associations as 
pressure groups and political parties as actors competing for power and the interface between the 
two. Except for the Republican Party of India which became active in Punjab in 1960s in 
particular and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the 1990s, the obvious and direct connection 
between political party and caste has not been institutionalised in Punjab. The initial success of 
the BSP is history and whatever was left of the party is slowly coming to an end through splits 
and merger with any of the main political parties of the state, namely the SAD and the Congress 
party. One may conclude that what is left of any consequence in caste politics in Punjab is 
pressure politics through caste associations.  
Interestingly, caste associations in Punjab are mostly divorced from pressure group 
politics. Most of these associations are busy in claiming Rajput lineage and working hard on it. 
Many middle castes covered under the OBCs have changed their caste names. These names 
clearly show the motive involved in the process. Now Jheers (waterman) insist on their being 
Kashav Rajput, Kumhars (potter) are Prajapati Rajput and Chhimbas (tailor) claim to be Tonk 
Kshatriya. Virtually every caste insists fiercely on its being Rajput. The most important example 
is that of Mahtons.  The Mahtons have the dubious distinction of being the first caste group to 
have formed the caste association in the19th century. Before we go into the story of their caste 
association, it is worthwhile to inform that they are an upper caste. Mahton caste is comprised by 
various clans whose names correspond with the Rajput clans. The Mahtons are small 
landowners, but have excelled well in all walks of life. Virtually all Mahatons originally 
belonged to the Doaba region. In the Census of 1881, the Mahtons were recorded as Mahatams. 
Was it a correct enumeration? It is not clear. Mahatam is a caste of untouchables whose 
occupational status was not clear. They handled skin of the dead animals, but in the popular 
perception of Punjabis, stealing was their main occupation. Till recently they were covered under 
OBCs, but a couple of years back they were categorised as the scheduled castes. Most of them 
converted to Sikhism and they are now called Rai Sikh. The Mahtons reacted to this enumeration 
by organising an association and fought legal battle for the martial status. It should be noted that 
the British had the policy of recognising certain castes as martial race, thereby eligible for the 
recruitment to the army. The enumeration of the Mahtons as Mahatmas implied that they were 
not eligible for recruitment to the British army. Finally, they won the case and were recognised 
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as martial race and eligible for recruitment in the army. Thus began the claim for the Rajput 
status. However, it was during the last three decades that they have become aggressively insistent 
about their Rajput status. Now they claim to be Sikh Rajputs and have uncomfortable 
relationship with the Jat Sikhs.  
It is among the dalits that the caste associations are assertive and aim at influencing the 
political process of the state. Virtually every dalit caste of note has a caste association. At the 
same time, the dalits of Punjab are divided along caste lines, both politically and socially. Some 
of the dalit castes have been asking the government to be categorised as the scheduled tribes. The 
Punjab government had transformed the status of all the de-notified tribes into the scheduled 
castes. The caste associations of Bazigars, Sansi, Bourias, to name the few are clamouring for 
proportionate reservations for the jobs in the government and interestingly, the Balmikis and the 
Mazabis are also demanding for the same – a demand which has been recently conceded in the 
Punjab Civil Service examinations. The Chamar/Ad-dharmi caste has been adversely affected by 
this proportionate reservation and ironically they are articulating the argument against this 
practice which has been consistently used by the upper castes against the reservation policy. It is 
also important to know that the Chamar/Ad-dharmi caste is the major beneficiary of the 
reservation policy. Along with Balmiki/Mazabi caste the Chamars are the most numerous in 
Punjab, but the former remained at the lowest step of the ladder so far as education and 
development are concerned.  
The caste whose collective actions could be justifiably put under the category of “change 
in the caste hierarchy” leading to political implications is Chamar/Ad-dharmi. For the sake of 
clarification and to avoid nomenclatural confusion we may add Ramdasia and Ravidasia also. 
Since they are all Chamars, the subsequent reference to all these caste names would be covered 
under the umbrella term, ‘Chamar’. The Chamars have been consistently organising themselves 
to challenge the domination of landowning castes, particularly the Jats. However, 73rd 
amendment of the constitution has blurred our understanding with regard to whether 
participation in the local political process on the part of dalits has been enabled by the 73rd 
amendment or it is a case of dalit assertion. The conflict between the landowning Jats and the 
dalit agricultural workers over wages has more or less disappeared, but the dalit assertion has 
been taking place in two contexts. The first is the Panchayat elections and the second is religious 
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places. I have already dealt with these issues in a great detail (see Judge and Bal 2009 and Judge 
2010).  
During the Panchayat elections the dalit-Jat clash occurred at Domeli (Kapurthala 
district) and Pandori Khajoor (Hoshiarpur district) villages in 2003 and was widely covered by 
newspapers. In a study conducted by Thakur and Singh (2009), it was clear that a considerable 
amount of threat of violence comes form the landowners who are divided along the political 
lines. Five villages which they studied had a history of clashes between the dalits and the 
landowners in 2003. They concluded that in the case of Amritsar villages, 73rd amendment had 
failed to empower the dalits. However, they studied villages where the Mazabis and Jats were 
situated in asymmetrical power relations. The situation in Doaba region is quite different though 
it might not be concluded that the Jats have completely lost their domination. Chamar assertion is 
manifesting over religious issues. At the local level, the Chamars have begun to assert to either 
control the religious place or insist on equal participation in the management of religious place. 
In the former case, they are reclaiming the religious place which they were earlier controlling, 
but the Jats forcibly wrested the control from them. The case of conflict between the Jats and the 
dalits in village Mahem in Nakodar tehsil of Jalandhar district involving the Baba Khazan Singh 
Udasi Dera in 2003 is one such example. It was looked after by the Ad Dharmis of the village, 
but the Jats Sikhs forcibly took over its control. They removed all the symbols of Udasis and 
installed the Nishan Sahib and Guru Granth Sahib in the Dera’s building (Judge and Bal 2009). 
Ironically, the Udasis are considered part of the Sikh tradition. However, after the construction of 
the Sikh orthodox tradition in the 19th century through the Singh Sabha movement, the Udasis 
have been marginalised.  
The issue of equal participation in the management of gurdwara led to a serious clash in 
2003 between Jat Sikhs and the Chamars in village Talhan which drew lot of attention. Why did 
it happen? It is for the first time in Punjab that the political unity between the urban and the rural 
Chamars came to the fore. The Chamars living in Boota Mandi in Jalandhar virtually took the 
movement in the village in their hands. The Chamars of Boota Mandi are economically powerful 
enough to sustain such movement anywhere in Doaba. The most crucial element in the conflict 
was that it involved a gurdwara and the Chamars in Talhan were Hindus. The clash facilitated 
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the inclusion of a Chamar in the management of the gurdwara provided he became a gursikh and 
stopped smoking tobacco.  
The most recent occurrence is the violent agitation of the Chamars (again the rural and 
urban Chamars banded together) that occurred in reaction to the murder of a Sant in Vienna, 
Austria. He was the close aide of the chief of Sach Khand Ballan Dera, Sant Niranjan Das. The 
role of activists of the Ambedkar Sena comprised of young Chamars who actively engaged in 
arson and other violent activities and came on motorcycles to do all this was the most noticeable 
dimension of the agitation.   
One common factor between the two events separated by long six years was that in the 
initial period the state government remained a mute witness to the violence. In the first even 
when the Congress party was in power in Punjab, the state intervened only when the threat of 
fundamentalist Sikh organisation taking over the gurdwara loomed large. In the second case, the 
violence stopped not because the SAD-BJP government sought to do this, but it happened 
because other people started clashing with the activists of the Ambedkar Sena. The reason for 
state indifference was quite clear. In the absence of the BSP as a political power, the Chamars in 
Doaba are seen as potential allies. However, there is always a limit to which political interests of 
any party could allow the Chamars to mobilise without state intervention, for there is always a 
danger of alienating other pressure groups. Political space is much broader than the elections and 
votes. The dalit organisation making efforts to assert their identities may not necessarily bring 
about change in the caste differentiation and since caste system is both structural as well as 
ideology, the mindset may perpetuate hierarchy leading towards exclusions in the private space 
and exclusiveness in the public space. For example, during all cases of mobilisation of the 
Chamars, the Balmikis and Meghs remained indifferent to what was going on. Exclusiveness of 





Despite the changing caste scenario in the rural Punjab, it is not easy to arrive at definite 
conclusion that political assertion is the direct result of the occupational change. Caste hierarchy 
has certainly undergone a change due to education and occupational changes, but the dalit 
assertion may not necessarily be the direct consequence of this change. All castes have not 
experienced change in their conditions uniformly, but political mobilisation is not a corollary to 
the economic transformation in every case. Therefore, political implications of changing caste 
hierarchy in Punjab are not characterised by a major shift in party politics. Changes are not 
leading towards an inclusive society. With the sole exception of ideological commitment to the 
equality of worship among the Sikhs, all developments are indicating towards the emergence of 
exclusive caste groups. The direction of development is towards less disintegration of intercaste 
boundaries, but tremendous decline in the forces maintaining hierarchy. Such a process is not 
leading towards political assertion of dalits as a united front. Ignatieff (1994) conceptualises 
Freud’s concept of ‘narcissism of minor difference’ in order to show how ethnic nationalisms 
emerge. In the case of various dalits the similar kind of narcissism exists and prevails in their 
internal castewise relationships. None of the castes is moving towards inclusive approach within 
the context of dalits to confront domination of upper castes. In the hands of the upper castes the 
narcissism of minor difference turns into the politics of difference, as these differences are 
exploited along religious and social lines. The consequence of the politics of difference is 
exclusiveness of each dalit caste paving the way for the political domination of the traditional 
political parties, namely, the SAD and the Congress party, and both are controlled by the Jat 
Sikhs. Thus we have ruptured social hierarchy with the perpetuation of pattern of political 
dominance the consequence of which is the reinforcement of caste identities and formation of 
exclusive caste communities. 
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